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This paper studies the impact of incentives on worker self-selection in a
controlled laboratory experiment. Subjects face the choice between a ﬁxed
and a variable payment scheme. Depending on the treatment, the variable
payment is a piece rate, a tournament or a revenue-sharing scheme. We
ﬁnd that output is higher in the variable pay schemes (piece rate, tourna-
ment, and revenue sharing) compared to the ﬁxed payment scheme. This
diﬀerence is largely driven by productivity sorting. In addition personal
attitudes such as willingness to take risks and relative self-assessment as
well as gender aﬀect the sorting decision in a systematic way. Moreover,
self-reported eﬀort is signiﬁcantly higher in all variable pay conditions
than in the ﬁxed wage condition. Our lab ﬁndings are supported by an
additional analysis using data from a large and representative sample. In
sum, our ﬁndings underline the importance of multi-dimensional sorting,
i.e., the tendency for diﬀerent incentive schemes to systematically attract
people with diﬀerent individual characteristics.
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2Introduction
Typically the rationale for providing incentive schemes is to align the interests of prin-
cipals and agents in the presence of a contract enforcement problem. This view under-
estimates the importance of worker self-selection, i.e., the possibility that agents with
diﬀerent individual characteristics feel attracted by diﬀerent pay schemes and therefore
systematically self-select into particular ﬁrms and organizations. In the presence of self-
selection performance is likely to depend not only on the the incentive eﬀect per se, but
also on the sorting eﬀect, which aﬀects the composition of the workforce. A few studies
(e.g., Edward P. Lazear, 2000) indicate that productivity sorting contributes to output
diﬀerences between diﬀerent incentive systems. Little is known empirically, however,
about the nature of this selection process along other dimensions that are crucial to an
organization’s success such as workers’ preferences and attitudes.
Field data often lack important information on workers’ preferences and motives, and
confounding factors impede causal inference. This paper therefore explores the driving
forces of self-selection in a controlled laboratory environment. We address the follow-
ing questions: Which personal characteristics beyond individual productivity diﬀerences
provoke workers to self-select into variable instead of ﬁxed pay contracts? In particular,
how do relevant characteristics like risk aversion, relative self-assessment, social prefer-
ences, gender or personality shape the selection process? How does the composition of
the workforce diﬀer when ﬁrms oﬀer either ﬁxed wages or variable payments in the form
of piece rates, tournaments, or revenue sharing?
The idea of the experiment is to ﬁrst elicit subjects’ individual productivity levels.
Subjects then face the choice between a variable and a ﬁxed payment scheme. We ob-
serve which payment mode they prefer and how much they work. We then elicit further
individual characteristics that may be relevant for the sorting decision. Finally, we obtain
self-reported measures of work eﬀort, stress and exhaustion. The work task consists of
multiplying one-digit numbers by two-digit numbers and is characterized by a substan-
tial degree of heterogeneity in productivity. We study three treatment conditions, which
are characterized by diﬀerent variable pay schemes. This allows us to study the sorting
patterns when the choice is between a ﬁxed payment on the one hand and either a piece
rate, a tournament, or a revenue-sharing scheme on the other hand. These three forms
of variable pay constitute the most important forms of explicit performance incentives.
Since the treatments are exactly identical except for the alternative variable pay scheme,
our design allows us to study diﬀerent sorting patterns as a response to these diﬀerent
pay schemes in a uniform and comprehensive framework.
Our results reveal the importance of multi-dimensional sorting. We ﬁrst establish that
output in all variable payment schemes is higher than output under the ﬁxed wage regime.
This output diﬀerence is mainly attributable to productivity sorting, which is strong and
present in all three treatments. When facing the alternative between variable and ﬁxed
payments, more productive workers systematically prefer the variable pay. This holds re-
gardless of whether the latter is oﬀered as a piece rate, a tournament or a revenue-sharing
scheme. Our results further show that relative self-assessment plays an important role
for sorting into tournaments, which makes sense as payments in tournament schemes
depend on relative performance. Another important driver of self-selection is a subject’s
attitude towards risk: the likelihood that subjects prefer the piece rate or the tournament
is higher the less risk averse they are. This ﬁnding reﬂects the fact that the ﬁxed pay-
ment yields a safe payoﬀ whereas earnings variation renders the variable pay alternative
risky. We also show that women are less likely to select into variable pay schemes than
men. This is mostly explained by diﬀerences in risk attitudes and productivity between
men and women. In an additional analysis we show that the extent to which personal
3characteristics aﬀect the sorting decision depends on whether a subject is a “marginal”
type, i.e., someone whose decision is on the fence. We either use the location in the
productivity distribution or response times in order to characterize marginal types. It
is plausible to assume that those who are on the fence take a longer time to make their
sorting decision. It turns out that sorting patterns do in fact vary by this criterion. For
example, risk attitudes play a bigger role in the piece-rate treatment for subjects who are
marginal, i.e., who either contemplate longer or are close to the productivity threshold
that makes them indiﬀerent between ﬁxed wages and piece rates. Diﬀerential patterns
for marginal and non-marginal types are also observed in the tournament and revenue-
sharing treatments. For example, in the tournament treatment risk attitudes matter for
marginal types but not for non-marginal types who base their decision on productivity
and relative self-assessment.
On top of the observed sorting patterns we show that self-reported eﬀort and work
output vary signiﬁcantly with diﬀerent incentives. In comparison to those working under
ﬁxed wages, subjects working under variable pay schemes report signiﬁcantly higher eﬀort
levels as well as higher levels of stress and exhaustion.
In Section III we compare our sorting results with sorting that takes place in the
German labor market. This complementary analysis is based on data from the German
Socio-Economic Panel Study (SOEP), a large panel survey that is representative of the
resident adult population. We estimate how productivity, risk attitudes, social preferences
and gender aﬀect the probability of working under variable pay. The picture that emerges
is very similar to the laboratory results: More productive and risk tolerant workers are
more likely to work for performance pay while women are less likely to work under variable
payment schemes. This result in combination with our controlled lab evidence provides
a powerful conﬁrmation of the importance of multi-dimensional sorting.
The literature on optimal incentives has shown that characteristics of the production
processes and the information structure aﬀect optimal employment contracts.1 Our re-
sults indicate that organizations should, in addition, take into account the interaction
of incentives and multi-dimensional sorting when deciding on the design of the incentive
system. This follows from the fact that worker characteristics and preferences aﬀect the
success of ﬁrms. This is quite obvious for productivity. But also risk or social prefer-
ences, as well as self-assessments may have an important inﬂuence on a ﬁrm’s success.
For example, if an investment company attracts relatively risk loving and overconﬁdent
fund managers, this will most likely aﬀect the company’s portfolio strategy. As another
example, social preferences can be relevant for reducing free-riding in teams and may
therefore positively aﬀect output (see, e.g., Ernst Fehr and Simon Ga¨chter, 2000). Of
course, many of the discussed worker attributes are typically unobservable during the
hiring process. In this sense our results suggest that ﬁrms may use incentive schemes
as screening devices to attract particular types of workers (Joanne Salop and Steven Sa-
lop, 1976). To the extent that ﬁrms, even when operating in similar environments, have
diﬀerent preferences regarding the composition of their workforce, our results oﬀer an
1Early work (e.g., Joseph E. Stiglitz, 1975) focused on the role of monitoring costs and imperfect
information about individuals’ abilities. Implications for the choice between piece-rate contracts and
time-rate contracts in the presence of monitoring costs have also been amply studied (see, e.g., Charles
Brown, 1990, 1992, 1994; Claudia Goldin, 1986; Daniel Parent, 1999; John H. Pencavel, 1977). Lazear
and Sherwin Rosen (1981) have proposed rank order tournament as optimal incentive contracts when
reliable monitors of eﬀort are too costly. Optimal multiperiod incentive schemes have been considered in
another strand of the literature (e.g., Jean-Jacques Laﬀont and Jean Tirole, 1988), which also highlights
the role of future commitment (see David P. Baron and David Besanko, 1984; Robert Gibbons, 1987;
Yoshitsugu Kanemoto and W. Bentley MacLeod, 1992). For evidence on the interplay between job
characteristics and the incidence of particular compensation contracts see also MacLeod and Parent
(1999).
4explanation for why ﬁrms install diﬀerent remuneration schemes. Our results also imply
that changing the pay system sets oﬀ sorting processes beyond productivity sorting. This
change in the workforce composition might aﬀect several procedures inside the ﬁrm and
change the entire work environment or ﬁrm culture (see, e.g., Michael Kosfeld and Fer-
dinand von Siemens, 2007). It is also important to realize that introducing variable pay
in certain jobs that are predominantly characterized by ﬁxed wage schemes, such as the
public sector, are likely to reduce job satisfaction among incumbent workers who prefer
the previous wage system, as revealed by their past choice.
Showing the relevance of sorting also underlines the methodological diﬃculties associ-
ated with testing contract theory with ﬁeld data (Canice Prendergast, 1999; Pierre-Andre´
Chiappori and Bernard Salanie´, 2003). When comparing output under performance pay
schemes to output when remuneration is independent of eﬀort, it is often hard to deter-
mine whether higher output under the former is due to incentives or sorting. This point
has been made in the theoretical analysis by Lazear (1986) and empirically shown in a
well-known case study of a ﬁrm that changed from ﬁxed wages to piece rates (Lazear,
2000). Ignoring the sorting eﬀect would imply a dramatic overestimation of the incentive
eﬀect. Our results conﬁrm Lazear’s (2000) ﬁnding that productivity sorting is an im-
portant source of output diﬀerences between piece-rate and ﬁxed-wage pay schemes, but
also highlight that productivity sorting is a key driver of positive output eﬀects of other
variable pay schemes, such as tournaments and revenue sharing. Moreover, our results
point to another potential confounding factor in testing contract theory: Preference and
self-assessment sorting. It is well known that optimal contracts depend on risk prefer-
ences. In light of our ﬁndings, the composition of preferences and individual attitudes in
a given pool of agents is likely to be endogenous.
Ruling out endogeneity that stems from selection is an important rationale for con-
ducting laboratory experiments. In the lab it is easy to implement random treatment
assignment in order to rule out sorting and to get unbiased estimates of the incentive
eﬀects of diﬀerent incentive schemes. In this way, experiments have produced valuable
and indispensable knowledge about the incentive eﬀects of diﬀerent incentive schemes.2
Our experimental design shows that experiments can also be used to study sorting in a
controlled way.3 A similar approach was used in the studies by Bram C. Cadsby, Fei
Song, and Francis Tapon (2007) and Eriksson, Sabrina Teyssier, and Villeval (2009) who
show that eﬀort variability in tournaments is lower when agents can decide whether to
work under piece rates or under tournament incentives. This is also the choice that sub-
jects face in the experiment by Muriel Niederle and Lise Vesterlund (2007). Based on the
ﬁnding that women perform worse in the presence of men in competitive environments
(Uri Gneezy and Aldo Rustichini, 2004) they study whether women shy away from com-
petition. They ﬁnd that women are less willing to compete in tournaments compared
2Using random treatment assignment, tournament incentives have been studied, e.g., by Clive Bull,
Andrew Schotter and Keith Weigelt (1987), Schotter and Weigelt (1992), Armin Falk and Fehr (2002)
and Christine Harbring and Bernd Irlenbusch (2003). The lab evidence on tournaments is complemented
by ﬁeld studies on corporate tournaments (Michael L. Bognanno, 2001), tournaments in agricultural
production (Charles R. Knoeber and Walter N. Thurman, 1994) and sports tournaments (e.g., Ronald
G. Ehrenberg and Bognanno, 1990; Sue Fernie and David Metcalf, 1999; and Uwe Sunde, 2009). The
incentive eﬀects of piece rates have been experimentally investigated, e.g., by Bull, Schotter and Weigelt
(1987) and Frans van Dijk, Joep Sonnemans and Frans van Winden (2001), while team incentives have
been studied, e.g., by Haig Nalbantian and Schotter (1997). The impact of incentives has also been
studied in ﬁeld experiments, e.g., Oriana Bandiera, Iwan Barankay, and Imran Rasul (2005) and Daniel
S. Nagin et al. (2002).
3In a similar vein sorting has been studied, e.g., in a market entry game (Colin F. Camerer and Dan
Lovallo, 1999), in simple bargaining games (Felix Oberholzer-Gee and Reiner Eichenberger, 2008; and
Lazear, Ulrike Malmendier and Roberto A. Weber, 2005), the gift-exchange game (Tor Eriksson and
Marie-Claire Villeval, 2008) or the prisoner’s dilemma game (Iris Bohnet and Dorothea Ku¨bler, 2005).
5to men when the alternative is to work under piece rates. As mentioned above, this is
similar to our ﬁnding that women are less likely to select into variable pay than men
when the alternative is a ﬁxed payment. In this sense sorting oﬀers a possible channel for
gender diﬀerences in occupational choice, career choice and ultimately for the existence
of the gender wage gap.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section describes the experiment. Section
II presents the results. We ﬁrst discuss the output eﬀects of diﬀerent incentive schemes.
Then we present evidence on the importance of sorting. Finally, we discuss the eﬀect of
incentives on the provision of eﬀort. In Section III we provide additional survey evidence
and discuss implications of our results.
I. An Experimental Approach to the Study of Incentives and
Multi-Dimensional Sorting
The ideal data set for studying how individual characteristics aﬀect the sorting deci-
sion into diﬀerent incentive schemes combines knowledge of individual productivity and
personal characteristics along with direct observation of the selection decision in a well
deﬁned environment. Such data are diﬃcult to obtain in the ﬁeld. First, individuals’
characteristics and preferences are typically not observed. This holds for productivity
measures, but even more so for personal attributes like risk aversion, social preferences
or relative self-assessment. Second, workers are typically exposed to a mix of explicit
and implicit incentives, which complicates an accurate characterization of the incentives
that actually prevail in a given work environment. Suppose, for example, that the re-
searcher observes that a ﬁrm has established piece-rate contracts. This neither precludes
the possibility that workers are also motivated by the threat of dismissal or the chance of
being promoted, nor that they are simultaneously confronted with additional incentives
that directly aﬀect remuneration, for example, bonus payments or team incentives like
proﬁt sharing. Likewise, workers without explicit performance pay contracts might face
work incentives stemming from implicit contracts and repeated game eﬀects (MacLeod
and James M. Malcomson, 1989, 1998). Third, individual output measures are often
not available or are fraught with measurement error. Fourth, it is only appropriate to
interpret policy changes in ﬁrms as natural experiments if these changes are exogenous,
which is always debatable. Finally, policy changes need time to aﬀect the endogenous
composition of the workforce and it is not obvious what time frame the researcher should
consider. Allowing too little time for sorting to take place will lead to an underestimation
of the sorting eﬀect. Waiting too long, however, increases the likelihood that other factors
besides the change in the incentive scheme will aﬀect the sorting process.
We think that experiments oﬀer a valuable tool for studying incentives and sorting in
a controlled environment, complementing the evidence generated by observational ﬁeld
studies in an informative way (see Section III and Falk and James J. Heckman, 2009). In
the lab, it is possible to precisely deﬁne the material incentives upon which subjects can
base their sorting decision. It is further possible to elicit measures of individual produc-
tivity with little measurement error as well as individual characteristics and preferences.
Furthermore we rule out any mix of diﬀerent implicit or explicit incentives. Finally, since
the sorting decision takes place immediately, timing is not an issue.
6A. The Work Task
The work task implemented in our experiment consists of multiplying one-digit numbers
by two-digit numbers. This “real eﬀort” task implies that subjects have to actually work4
and are to some extent uncertain about their productivity and the productivity of others.
This is a realistic feature of most work tasks and leaves room for sorting according to
(relative) self-assessment. As a task, multiplying numbers is also well suited for our
purposes because it requires no previous knowledge, is easy to explain, and guarantees
a suﬃcient degree of heterogeneity in productivity. Moreover, this task is a relatively
good proxy for general cognitive ability, and in light of recent neuroscience evidence,
learning eﬀects during the experiment are expected to be small (Gerhard Roth, 2001).
Depending on the chosen numbers, the diﬃculty level of multiplying one-digit numbers by
two-digit numbers varies quite a bit. This has to do with the fact that diﬀerent problems
require diﬀerent usages of working memory. In particular, we distinguish between ﬁve
diﬀerent degrees of diﬃculty.5 As we will see below, solving more diﬃcult problems is
more time-consuming.
All problems were presented to subjects on computer screens (see Appendix). They
had to type their answer in a box and conﬁrm it by clicking an “OK”-button with their
mouse. Having entered the answer, a subject was informed whether or not the solution
was correct. If it was correct, a new problem appeared instantaneously on the screen
(except in steps 1 and 2 of the experiment where only one problem had to be solved, see
below). If the answer was wrong, subjects had to tackle the same problem again until
the correct solution was entered. We forced subjects to solve a problem before a new
question appeared on the screen in order to prevent subjects from guessing and searching
for “easy” problems. A subject was always informed about the cumulative number of
problems he or she had answered correctly.
B. Design and Treatments of the Experiment
In order to study how individual characteristics aﬀect the sorting decision into diﬀerent
incentive schemes, we implemented an experiment that includes 12 steps (see Figure A.1
in the Appendix). Subjects were informed at the beginning that they would go through
diﬀerent steps, but they did not know what these steps would look like. The ﬁrst three
steps are designed to elicit three diﬀerent measures of individual productivity. In the ﬁrst
step, all subjects were asked to calculate one multiplication problem as fast as possible.
The problem that they were confronted with on the computer screen had a degree of
diﬃculty 4. No payment was involved. The time that elapsed before the correct answer
was entered is our ﬁrst productivity indicator (Productivity Indicator 1).
The second productivity measure (Productivity Indicator 2) is basically the same as
the ﬁrst, except that this time subjects were paid for being fast. Again they were asked
to calculate one problem with degree of diﬃculty 4 as fast as possible. This time, they
were endowed with 150 points. Subjects were told that 5 points would be subtracted
from this endowment for each second they needed for solving the problem. This means,
e.g., that a subject who answered the question after 15 seconds earned 75 points while
4This is in contrast to most economic labor market experiments that mimic eﬀort costs by requiring
subjects to choose a number, with higher numbers costing more money. Other real eﬀort experiments
include, e.g., Rene´ Fahr and Bernd Irlenbusch (2000) who have subjects crack walnuts, van Dijk, Son-
nemans and van Winden (2001) who asked subjects to perform cognitively demanding tasks on the
computer, Gneezy, Niederle, and Rustichini (2003) who had subjects solve mazes at the computer and
Falk and Andrea Ichino (2006) who asked subjects to stuﬀ letters into envelopes.
5Examples for the ﬁve levels of diﬃculty are: Level 1: 11 · 9; Level 2: 3 · 32; Level 3: 6 · 43; Level 4:
4 · 68; Level 5: 7 · 89.
7someone who needed 22 seconds received only 40 points, etc.; subjects who did not come
up with the correct answer in 30 seconds earned nothing. A clock on the screen informed
about how many of the 30 seconds had elapsed.
Our third measure of an individual’s productivity (Productivity Indicator 3) is the
number of problems that a subject solved when working for ﬁve minutes for a piece rate
of 10 points per correct answer. Each subject went through the exact same sequence of
problems. We implemented a stratiﬁed sampling design of questions, i.e., each block of
10 problems had the following structure in terms of diﬃculty: One problem of degree
1, one problem of degree 2, two problems of degree 3, four problems of degree 4, and
two problems of degree 5. The sequence of questions within a block of ten questions
was random. Since our third productivity indicator is based on a sequence of problems of
diﬀerent diﬃculty levels (i.e., just like in the actual work task in step 8 of the experiment)
rather than on a single question, it is most informative for the work environment under
study. We will therefore focus on Productivity Indicator 3 in Section II.
In step 4 we asked subjects to subjectively assess how hard they had worked in the
ﬁve minute working time in step 3. In particular, we asked the following three questions:
How much eﬀort did you exert? How stressed did you feel? How exhausted did you get?
Answers to these questions were given on a seven point Likert scale, where the value 1
means ‘not at all’ and the value 7 means ‘very much’. Then, in step 5, we asked subjects to
assess their performance in step 3 relative to the performance of the other 19 participants
in their session. We are interested in this assessment to ﬁnd out whether it aﬀects the
sorting decision (in particular into tournaments) and whether selection into variable pay
schemes is associated with relative overassessment. The question subjects had to answer
reads as follows: How many of the other 19 participants solved more questions than you
did? Subjects had an incentive to answer the question as accurate as possible. For a
correct estimate they received 100 points, for a deviation of plus or minus one from the
correct number they received 50 points, and zero points otherwise. Subjects were not
informed about their true rank in the distribution before the very end of the experiment.
Step 6 is the actual sorting decision. Subjects were informed that they were to work
for ten minutes on the same work task as before, i.e., multiplying one-digit and two-
digit numbers, with a similar degree of diﬃculty. Before they started to work, they were
oﬀered the choice between a variable pay contract and a ﬁxed-payment contract. The
chosen contract determined how they were paid for the output they produced later in the
10-minute work period. In each of our three treatments, the ﬁxed-payment contract, wF ,
guarantees the payment of 400 points independent of output x, the number of correctly
answered problems, i.e.,
(1) wFi = 400.
It was made clear to subjects that they would receive 400 points independent of whether
they solved a few, many, or no problems at all. The only requirement for receiving the
400 points was that they had to stay in the lab.
The type of variable pay scheme oﬀered as an alternative to the ﬁxed wage deﬁnes each
of our three treatments. We study piece-rate, tournament and revenue-sharing contracts.
In the piece-rate treatment, the alternative contract paid a piece rate of ten points per
correct answer, just as in step 3. Remuneration of subject i according to the piece-rate
contract, wPR, is given by
(2) wPRi = 10 · xi.
In the tournament treatment, subject i could choose to compete in a two-person tour-
8nament, in which the opponent j was randomly chosen among all subjects who had also
opted for the tournament. Among the two competitors, the subject who had solved more
problems at the end of the 10-minute work period won the tournament and received the
winner prize of 1,300 points. The loser received zero points. If both competitors had
solved the same number of problems, the winner was determined by a random draw. The
tournament contract wT for player i is given by
(3) wTi =
⎧⎨
⎩
1300 if xi > xj , i = j,
1300 with probability 0.5 and 0 with probability 0.5 if xi = xj ,
0 otherwise
Subject i was informed about opponent j’s output only after the working time of ten
minutes was over. If an odd number of subjects had selected into the tournament, one
randomly chosen subject’s output was used a second time to determine the score of the
unmatched subject’s opponent. If only one subject opted for the tournament (which did
not happen), no tournament was implemented and the subject was informed that he or
she would be compensated according to the ﬁxed-payment contract wF . Subjects were
informed about these details prior to their sorting decision.
In the revenue-sharing treatment, subjects could choose to work for a revenue sharing
contract as an alternative to the ﬁxed wage contract wF . Two subjects who opted for
this compensation were randomly matched and formed a team. The team received a
piece rate of ten points for each correctly answered problem. A team’s revenue was then
divided equally among the two team members. The compensation for player i in the
revenue-sharing condition wRS is hence given by
(4) wRSi = 10 ·
xi + xj
2
.
Again, the output of the other team member j was disclosed only after the end of the
10-minute working time. If only one subject or an odd number of subjects decided to
work under revenue-sharing incentives, the same rules as under the tournament treatment
applied.
Right after the sorting decision but before the actual working time began, we asked all
subjects in step 7 how they would have decided if the ﬁxed payment had been diﬀerent.
In particular, subjects had to indicate whether they would prefer the treatment-speciﬁc
variable pay or the ﬁxed payments of {50, 100, 150, ..., 800} points. These hypothetical
choices reveal information about sorting patterns at more or less attractive ﬁxed payment
alternatives.
Step 8 is the 10-minutes working time, during which subjects worked under their pre-
ferred contractual terms, i.e., either for a ﬁxed payment of 400 points or for the respective
variable pay. At the end of the working time, we notiﬁed subjects about their earnings,
and we disclosed the competitor’s output to tournament participants and the partner’s
output to team members. In step 9 we asked subjects to inform us on a seven point scale
about eﬀort, stress and exhaustion in exactly the same way as in step 4.
In the remaining three steps, we collected data on additional personal characteristics.
In step 10 we elicited subjects’ social preferences with the help of a simple trust game
(similar to Joyce Berg, John Dickhaut, and Kevin McCabe, 1995). Each subject played a
2-player, sequential trust game. Both players received an endowment of 120 points. The
ﬁrst mover could transfer any amount {0, 20, 40, 60, 80, 100, 120} to the second mover.
Any transfer was tripled. The second mover could then send back any amount between
zero and 480. To elicit information about player types we used the contingent response
9method, i.e., second movers had to indicate for each of the seven possible transfer levels
how much they wanted to transfer back to the ﬁrst mover, before they knew the actual
transfer. This is an incentive compatible way to elicit preferences since any decision
is potentially payoﬀ-relevant. In order to be able to classify each subject, everybody
had to play both roles, ﬁrst and second mover. After all choices had been made, pairs of
subjects were formed by random matching and the roles of ﬁrst and second movers within
a pair were assigned by a random draw. The players’ choices were then implemented,
and subjects were paid accordingly.
Step 11 elicits subjects’ risk preferences using simple lottery choices, similar to Charles
A. Holt and Susan K. Laury (2002). Participants in our experiment were shown a table
with 15 rows. In each row they had to decide whether they preferred a safe option or
playing a lottery. In the lottery they could win either 400 points or 0 points with 50
percent probability. The lottery was exactly the same in each row, but the safe option
increased from row to row. In the ﬁrst row, the safe option was 25 points; in the second it
was 50 points, and so on up to 375 points in row 15. After a subject had made a decision
for each row, it was randomly determined which row became relevant for payment. This
procedure guarantees that each decision was incentive compatible.
In the ﬁnal step 12, we elicited subjects’ risk attitudes in an alternative way, namely
by asking individuals to indicate their willingness to take risks in general on an eleven-
point scale, with zero indicating complete unwillingness to take risks, and ten indicating
complete willingness to take risks. We use the same wording of the question as in the
2004 wave of the German Socio-Economic Panel Study (see also Section III).6 Dohmen
et al. (2009) have validated the behavioral relevance of this general risk question in a ﬁeld
experiment with a representative subject pool of 450 individuals. They conclude that the
survey risk measure is a good predictor of risky choices with real money at stake.
We also gathered questionnaire data on socioeconomic characteristics (including gen-
der, age, nationality, marital status, and parents’ education), on educational achieve-
ment (grades and major ﬁelds of study on university-entrance examination (Abitur),
high-school graduation year, and last mathematics grade in high-school). Subjects also
completed a verbal IQ-test developed by Siegfried Lehrl et al. (1991), and a personal
attitudes test developed by Hermann Brandsta¨tter (see Brandsta¨tter, 1988).7
C. Procedural Details
The experiment was computerized using the software z-Tree (Urs Fischbacher, 1999).
All of the interaction was anonymous. Most of the instructions were presented on the
computer screen. At the very beginning, however, subjects were handed out a written
overview that informed them about the work task and presented the basic structure of
6The exact wording of the question (translated from German) is as follows: How do you see yourself:
“Are you generally a person who is fully prepared to take risks or do you try to avoid taking risks? Please
tick a box on the scale, where the value 0 means: ‘unwilling to take risks’ and the value 10 means: ‘fully
prepared to take risk’.”
7This so called 16 PA test is a short form of the German-language version of Raymond B. Cattell’s
sixteen personality factor questionnaire (16 PF), an internationally well established personality assess-
ment, that produces ﬁve dimensions of personality (the so-called “Big Five”). The German-language
version of the 16 PF was developed by Klaus A. Schneewind, Gundo Schro¨der and Raymond B. Cattell
(1983) and contains 192 items that compass sixteen primary scales of personality. These primary scales
produce ﬁve independent secondary factors (the so-called “Big Five”), which are commonly labeled as
conscientiousness, neuroticism, openness to experience, agreeableness and extroversion. Brandsta¨tter’s
short personal attitudes test presents subjects with 32 conﬂictive adjective pairs, which describe traits.
For each adjective pair, subjects indicate how they would assess themselves on a 9-point scale that is
spanned by the conﬂictive adjectives. Based on these 32 ratings, 16 primary factors are constructed. We
then use principal component analysis to extract the ﬁve principal components that describe personality.
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the experiment. Subjects were told that no aid was allowed for answering the problems
(calculator, paper and pencil etc.) and that we would check this throughout the exper-
iment. We ran eighteen sessions, six sessions in each of the three treatments. A total
of 360 subjects participated. We invited the same number of females and males in each
session and ended up with 181 female and 179 male participants.8 A session lasted, on
average about 90 minutes. Subjects were students from the University of Bonn. Ten
points in the experiment were exchanged for 0.17 Euro (1 Euro ∼ 1.30 US Dollar at that
time). Average earnings were 21.20 Euro.
II. Results
In this section we present the main results. In Section A, we start by investigating
whether subjects who opt for a variable pay contract produce more than subjects who
prefer to work for a ﬁxed payment. In Section B we focus on the role of sorting.
A. Output
Our ﬁrst result concerns output diﬀerences between variable and ﬁxed payment schemes.
We expect a positive output eﬀect of variable pay schemes for two reasons. First, more
productive subjects are likely to self-select into variable pay schemes, as we will address
in detail in the next section. Second, incentive theory predicts that subjects should work
at least as hard in the variable pay schemes as in the ﬁxed payment. Figures 1 and 2 in
fact show that output in all variable pay schemes is higher than output under the ﬁxed
wage regime. Charts (a), (b) and (c) of Figure 1 depict, for each of the three treatments,
the cumulative distributions of realized output during the 10-minute work period (step 8
of the experiment) separately for subjects who have self-selected into the ﬁxed payment
scheme and those who opted for variable pay. In all three treatments the output distribu-
tion in the variable pay condition statistically dominates the output distribution in the
respective ﬁxed payment condition. Subjects with a piece-rate contract solved on aver-
age 60.59 problems (sample standard deviation: 21.81) compared to 29.51 (std.dev. 14.22)
problems solved by subjects who worked for the ﬁxed payment in the same treatment.
The respective numbers in the tournament treatment are 61.08 (std.dev. 22.34) versus
36.08 (std.dev. 18.81) and in the revenue-sharing treatment 57.93 (std.dev. 28.02) versus
33.75 (std.dev. 16.93). Output diﬀerences between ﬁxed and variable pay schemes in all
treatments are statistically signiﬁcant at any conventional level (Wilcoxon rank-sum test,
p-value < 0.0001).9
Figure 2 restates this result in a diﬀerent way. The horizontal bars in the ﬁgure
represent how much time (in seconds) subjects with a particular remuneration contract
need on average to enter the correct solution to a problem with a certain degree of
diﬃculty. The brighter the bars the more diﬃcult is the respective problem. For example,
8We invited 12 men and 12 women to each session. The ﬁrst 20 subjects who showed up at the lab
participated in the experiment. The other subjects received a show-up fee and were asked to leave the
laboratory.
9Firms may not only be concerned about level eﬀects of output but also about diﬀerences in the
variance of output. We ﬁnd that diﬀerences in output variances for ﬁxed wage workers are not statistically
signiﬁcant at the 5 percent signiﬁcance level for any treatment comparison. Likewise, the variance of
output for workers who opted for the variable pay in the piece-rate treatment does not diﬀer signiﬁcantly
from the output variance among tournament participants (H0: variances are the same, p-value < 0.8427).
However, the diﬀerence in output variances among tournament participants and participants in the
revenue-sharing scheme is marginally statistically signiﬁcant (p-value < 0.0714), and the variance of
output among workers who opted for the variable pay in the revenue-sharing treatment is signiﬁcantly
higher than the output variance of variable-pay workers in the piece-rate treatment (p-value < 0.0337).
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in the piece-rate treatment subjects who work under the ﬁxed payment scheme need on
average about 25 seconds to correctly answer a problem of diﬃculty level 5. Those who
work on a piece-rate contract, however, need only about 13 seconds. The ﬁgure illustrates
that regardless of the treatment, the time needed to solve a problem increases in the level
of diﬃculty (level 1 to 5). Moreover, subjects in the variable pay schemes solve problems
much faster than those working for a ﬁxed payment. This holds for problems of all
diﬃculty levels but is most pronounced for relatively tough problems. This pattern is
explained by the fact that subjects in the ﬁxed payment condition simply need longer to
calculate problems, but also that the error rate, which generally rises with the degree of
diﬃculty, is higher for subjects in the ﬁxed payment schemes.10
B. Sorting
In order to explain the output diﬀerences discussed above and to understand the in-
teraction of incentive systems and sorting, we now analyze how sorting is aﬀected by
personal attributes. We start with productivity sorting.
Productivity
If subjects choose between the ﬁxed-payment contract wF (equation (1)) and the piece-
rate contract wPR (equation (2)), it is straightforward to show that subjects whose pro-
ductivity exceeds a certain threshold value optimally opt for the piece-rate contract, while
subjects with lower productivity prefer the ﬁxed-payment contract. This productivity
threshold increases in the level of the ﬁxed payment, and it decreases in the attractive-
ness of the piece rate.11 If the diﬀerence between optimal eﬀort costs under piece rates
and ﬁxed wages is suﬃciently small, risk-neutral subjects, who expect to solve more than
40 problems in 10 minutes, optimally choose the piece rate. This is the case for subjects
who produced more than 20 correct answers during the 5-minute work period and who
expect that they can solve twice as many problems in 10 minutes than in 5 minutes.
In the tournament, a similar productivity sorting pattern is plausible but not as obvious
as in the piece-rate treatment. The reason is the strategic nature of tournaments: A risk-
neutral subject optimally participates in the tournament if the winning prize of 1300
points multiplied by the probability of winning exceeds 400 points plus the value of the
disutility that results from providing higher eﬀort in the tournament than in the ﬁxed
10Subjects solved 95.4 percent of problems on their ﬁrst attempt when the degree of diﬃculty was
equal to 1, 91.4 percent when the degree of diﬃculty was 2, 87.8 percent when it was 3, 81.0 percent when
the degree of diﬃculty was 4 and 77.5 percent when it was 5. Holding constant the degree of diﬃculty
a probit analysis shows that subjects who selected the ﬁxed-payment contract are 3 percent more likely
on average to enter a wrong answer.
11More formally, this can be shown as follows: Assume that an individual’s output, xi, depends on
his productivity, πi, which is a function of ability, θi, and eﬀort, ei ≥ 0, i.e., the production function
is given by xi = π(θi, ei) + εi, where εi ∼ N(0, σ2ε), πθ, πe > 0 and πeθ ≥ 0. Subjects’ ability is
continuously distributed on the interval [θ, θ] according to the cumulative distribution function F (θ).
Assume that a subject’s utility depends positively on the wage w and negatively on eﬀort e according to
the utility function u(w, e) = w−c(e) with uw > 0, and uc < 0 since ce > 0. Expected utility in the ﬁxed
wage regime with wF = α > 0 is maximized if the minimum required level of eﬀort denoted by emin
is exerted, because remuneration is independent of eﬀort in the ﬁxed payment regime and ce > 0. In
our experiment, emin captures the cost of remaining in the lab, sitting silently in front of the computer
during the 10-minute work period. Expected utility under piece rates is maximized when the optimal
eﬀort level e∗, which satisﬁes δc(e)
δe
= β δπ
δe
. Risk-neutral subjects opt for the contract that results in
higher utility, so that the piece-rate contract is preferred when productivity exceeds the productivity
threshold, πˆ, which is given by πˆ =
α+c(e∗)−c(emin)
β
. The term c(e∗) − c(emin) captures the disutility
that results when eﬀort is raised from emin to e∗. Note that πˆ increases in α and decreases in β.
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payment.12 Thus the sorting decision does not only depend on own productivity but also
on the expected productivity of the other player who has sorted into the tournament.
Therefore the existence of a unique sorting threshold depends on various distributional
assumptions and is not guaranteed. Productivity sorting is also more likely the less
important luck is relative to diﬀerences in ability.13 In our experiment, “luck” could
be a sequence of easy problems, or subjective productivity shocks such as mood eﬀects
or other psychological aspects of motivation or distraction. Subjects could evaluate the
importance of luck prior to their sorting decision since they learned about the structure
of problems in the ﬁrst ﬁve minutes. They knew that the task and the diﬃculty level
of questions would be the same in the 10-minute work period. Productivity diﬀerences
are likely to dominate luck in determining output and thus the likelihood of winning.
As a consequence, we expect an outcome in which productive workers are more likely to
participate in the tournament than less productive workers.
As in the tournament treatment, the prediction for productivity sorting in the revenue-
sharing treatment depends on distributional assumptions. It is possible in theory to ﬁx
parameters such that either all subjects are expected to join the revenue-sharing contract,
or some are expected to join, either with or without a unique threshold. Note, however,
that for highly productive types, who can attain higher utility than under ﬁxed wages even
if their team partner does not produce anything, have a dominant strategy to sort into the
revenue-sharing scheme. Abstracting from eﬀort costs, the corresponding critical output
is 80 correct answers during the 10-minute working time.14 We therefore expect average
productivity to be higher among revenue-sharing participants than among subjects in
the ﬁxed wage scheme. Taken together, productivity sorting is likely to occur in all
treatments, and especially in the piece-rate treatment.
Our results conﬁrm systematic productivity sorting in all treatments. On average, the
more productive a worker, the more likely he self-selects into the variable pay scheme.
Support for this result comes from Figures 3 and 4. Figure 3 contains three charts, each of
which compares the cumulative distributions of productivity (measured by Productivity
Indicator 3) of subjects who sorted into the ﬁxed payment scheme and of subjects who
sorted into the variable payment scheme in a particular treatment. The fractions of
subjects who self-select into the variable pay scheme are 60.83 percent in the piece-rate
treatment, 50.0 percent in the tournament and 63.33 percent in the revenue-sharing
treatment. Chart (a) of Figure 3 clearly conﬁrms that those workers who self-select into
the piece rate are more productive. Charts (b) and (c) show the same ﬁnding for the
tournament and the revenue-sharing treatments, respectively. In line with our discussion
above, the productivity histograms for subjects in the revenue-sharing treatment also
12In the framework introduced in footnote 11, a risk-neutral subject optimally participates in the
tournament if γ · Prob{πi(θi, e∗i )− πj(θj , e∗j ) > 	j − 	i} ≥ α− c(emin) + c(e∗i ).
13For example, if luck is absent, i.e., σ = 0 in the production function, and ability is continuously
distributed on a closed interval [θ, θ], a more able contestant has an optimal eﬀort response function that
ensures winning the tournament against a less able competitor. Since the most able subject always wins
— and consequently enters the tournament — it is not optimal for a less productive person to compete.
Entering the tournament is a weakly dominant strategy for the most able subject as he receives the
outside option when no tournament takes place. In this setting no tournament takes place, as only the
most productive individual optimally opts for tournament incentives. On the other hand, everybody will
participate in the tournament if luck is suﬃciently important relative to productivity diﬀerences. Finally,
a sorting equilibrium, in which subjects whose ability exceeds a threshold θˆ with θ < θˆ < θ sort into
the tournament and less able subjects select into the ﬁxed payment scheme, may exist for intermediate
cases.
14Along the lines of footnote 11 it can be shown that subjects whose team partner does not pro-
duce any output optimally opt for the revenue-sharing contract if their own productivity exceeds
2(α−c(emin)+c(e∗))
β
.
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reveal that all subjects whose productivity exceeds 40 answers in 5 minutes, and who
should therefore expect to produce more than 80 correct answers in the 10-minute work
period, sort into the revenue-sharing scheme.
Wilcoxon rank-sum tests verify that the productivity diﬀerences are statistically signiﬁ-
cant in all treatments (p-values < 0.0001). Moreover, the diﬀerences in mean productivity
are quite sizeable. In the piece-rate treatment subjects who later opt for the piece-rate
contract have an average productivity (measured by Productivity Indicator 3) of 27.3
correct answers compared to an average productivity of 13.8 of subjects who sort into
a ﬁxed-payment contract. Corresponding numbers are 26.0 versus 16.4 for the tourna-
ment treatment, and 25.9 versus 14.9 for the revenue-sharing treatment. Since all three
productivity measures are highly signiﬁcantly correlated (Spearman rank correlations,
p-values < 0.0001), it is not surprising that our productivity result holds regardless of
the productivity indicator used.15
The fact that the productivity indicators are also highly signiﬁcantly correlated with
a measure of verbal IQ, the Abitur grade (Abitur is an exam that comes at the end of
university-track high school in Germany and is a prerequisite for attending university;
the grades range from 4.0, the worst grade, to 1.0, the best grade), and the ﬁnal math
grade in high school (ranging from 1, the worst grade, to 15, the best grade) suggests
that variable payment schemes attract generally more able subjects for the work task in
our experiment.16
An important implication of productivity sorting is that average productivity of a
selected group depends on the relative attractiveness of the contract alternatives. Recall
from our discussion above that the theoretical productivity threshold in the piece-rate
treatment increases in the level of the ﬁxed payment α. Consequently, we would expect
fewer and more productive workers to select into the piece-rate scheme when the ﬁxed
payment alternative becomes more attractive. Similarly, more productive workers should
choose the tournament or the revenue-sharing scheme as the level of the ﬁxed payment
increases. These predictions are born out by our data on hypothetical sorting decisions
elicited in step 7 of the experiment. The correlation between individual productivity and
the lowest ﬁxed wage a subject just prefers over the variable payment is positive and
15The Spearman rank correlation between Indicators 3 and 1 is -0.647 (p-value < 0.0001), i.e., individ-
uals who are faster in entering the correct answer in step 1 also solve more problems during the 5 minutes
in step 3. The Spearman rank correlation between Indicators 3 and 2 is -0.615 (p-value < 0.0001) among
the 290 individuals with uncensored observations, while the correlation between indicators 1 and 2 is
0.521 (p-value < 0.0001). Productivity diﬀerences, measured by indicators 1 and 2, between those who
opt for the ﬁxed payment and those who prefer the variable payment are highly signiﬁcant in all three
treatments. The median subjects in the piece-rate treatment, tournament treatment and revenue-sharing
treatment who opt for the ﬁxed payment need 27, 23 and 20.5 seconds respectively in order to solve the
problem in step 1 of the experiment (Productivity Indicator 1), while median subjects who opt for the
variable pay need 7, 8, and 12 seconds respectively. Similarly the median time needed to solve the prob-
lem in step 2 of the experiment (Productivity Indicator 2) is 16, 15.5 and 19.5 seconds for subjects who
opt for the ﬁxed payment and 7, 5.5 and 8 seconds for those who select into the variable pay scheme in
the piece-rate, tournament and revenue-sharing treatment respectively. Tests for equality of the median
productivity for subjects opting for the ﬁxed payment and variable payment yield continuity corrected
Pearson χ2(1) that imply p-values < 0.0001 for both productivity measures in the piece-rate treatment
and the tournament treatment and p-values < 0.05 for both productivity measures in the revenue-sharing
treatment.
16The Spearman rank correlations and corresponding p-values for verbal IQ test scores of German
participants and Productivity Indicators 1 to 3 are respectively: -0.127 (p-value < 0.05), -0.119 (p-value
< 0.05), 0.114 (p-value < 0.06). The Spearman rank correlations and corresponding p-values of math
grades and Productivity Indicators 1 to 3 are respectively: -0.296 (p-value < 0.001), -0.198 (p-value
< 0.002), and 0.286 (p-value < 0.001). The Spearman rank correlations and corresponding p-values of
Abitur grades and Productivity Indicators 1 to 3 are respectively: 0.267 (p-value < 0.001), 0.136 (p-value
< 0.011), and -0.224 (p-value < 0.001).
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highly signiﬁcant (Spearman rank correlations; p-values < 0.001 in all treatments).
Figure 4 shows the sorting pattern in all treatments for diﬀerent (hypothetical) ﬁxed
payments according to Productivity Indicator 3. Panel (a) displays the results for the
piece-rate treatment. The bars in the lower part of the panel reveal that the fraction of
workers who self-select into the piece rate is higher the lower the ﬁxed payment displayed
in steps of 50 points on the horizontal axis. For example, when the ﬁxed payment is
50, all workers prefer the piece rate, while 60.8 percent prefer the piece rate when the
ﬁxed payment is 400 points, the level actually implemented in the experiment. If the
ﬁxed payment is as high as 800 points, almost nobody selects into the piece-rate scheme
anymore.
The consequences for average productivity of the selected groups are displayed in the
top panel. Dark dots represent subjects sorting into the piece rate and grey diamonds
represent subjects sorting into the ﬁxed payment. The dashed grey horizontal line reﬂects
average productivity of all subjects who participated in this treatment. Since all workers
prefer the piece rate to ﬁxed payments for very low ﬁxed wages, the average productivity
in the piece-rate group coincides with the overall average productivity. As the ﬁxed
payment increases, typically the least productive workers from the piece-rate group start
sorting into the ﬁxed payment. This leads to an increase in the average productivity in
the piece rate group and to a relatively low productivity level in the ﬁxed wage group.
As the level of the ﬁxed payment increases, more productive workers select into the ﬁxed
payment group such that the average productivity in this group eventually approaches
the overall average.
The sorting pattern is similar in all three treatments (see Panel (b) for the tournament
and Panel (c) for the revenue-sharing treatment). As the ﬁxed wage becomes more
attractive, fewer and fewer subjects self-select into variable pay. Those workers who
switch to the ﬁxed payment as a response to an increased ﬁxed payment are typically
among the least productive of the subjects on the variable payment scheme. This leads
to the increase in productivity of the variable payment group.
Risk Attitudes, Relative Self-Assessment, Social Preferences and Gender
In the previous section we have shown that productivity systematically aﬀects self-
selection into diﬀerent incentive schemes. In this section we study further potential
drivers of self-selection: risk attitudes, relative self-assessment, social preferences and
gender. Table 1 provides raw correlations of these variables. We use a multiple regression
approach to determine how these factors jointly aﬀect the self-selection decision; and to
understand their relative importance. In presenting our results we mostly refer to Table 2,
which reports estimates of marginal eﬀects from Probit models in which the latent variable
is the propensity to opt for the variable pay alternative. Columns (1) to (3) contain
the results for the piece rate treatment, the tournament treatment and the revenue-
sharing treatment respectively. Column (4) displays results for the whole sample, pooling
all decisions for variable vs. ﬁxed payments. The set of explanatory variables consists
of risk attitudes, relative self-assessment, social preferences and gender, in addition to
productivity. In line with the results above, Table 2 shows that productivity is signiﬁcant
in all speciﬁcations. The respective coeﬃcient in Column (1), e.g., implies that solving one
additional problem in the ﬁve minute working task (Productivity Indicator 3) increases
the likelihood of selecting into the piece rate by 4.4 percent.
Risk attitudes are an obvious candidate to aﬀect the sorting decision into diﬀerent
incentive schemes.17 Risk is always involved in variable payment schemes simply because
incomes are uncertain. In contrast no risk is involved in the ﬁxed wage payment since
17Principal-agent theory has emphasized that risk-averse workers dislike the income risk that is associ-
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payments are independent of output. As a consequence the expected utility from variable
pay is lower for risk averse subjects than for risk neutral or risk loving subjects. Hence
we expect that subjects are less likely to select into variable pay the more risk averse they
are. This eﬀect should be particularly strong in the tournament treatment since earnings
uncertainty is most pronounced in this condition for two reasons: the spread of potential
earnings is higher (0 vs. 1300 points) and the contestant’s ability is not known.
In Table 2 we measure risk preferences by subjects’ responses to the risk question
elicited in step 12.18 It turns out that risk attitudes aﬀect the sorting decision. Risk
averse workers are less likely to self-select into piece rates (Column (1)) and tournaments
(Column (2)), while no such eﬀect is observed for the revenue-sharing treatment.19 In
the piece-rate treatment, a one point higher indication of willingness to take risks on
the eleven-point scale makes a subject 5.3 percent more likely to opt for the piece-rate
contract for a given level of productivity. The respective probability is 8.7 percent in the
tournament treatment indicating that quantitatively risk attitudes matter most in this
treatment. Pooling all observations from all conditions (Column (4)) yields a signiﬁcant
coeﬃcient of 5.4 percent.
A fundamental diﬀerence between piece rates and tournaments is that in piece-rate
schemes payoﬀs depend only on one’s own performance and are independent of other
workers’ outputs. As a consequence, beliefs about other workers’ productivity are irrel-
evant for the sorting decision in this treatment, but could aﬀect the sorting decision in
the tournament. We would therefore expect that subjects’ beliefs about their relative
rank should aﬀect the sorting decision in the tournament treatment while no such eﬀect
is expected in the piece-rate treatment.
We elicited a subject’s relative self-assessed rank in step 5 of the experiment. In raw
correlations relative self-assessment signiﬁcantly predicts sorting into the variable pay
condition in all three treatments (Spearman rank correlations; p-values < 0.0001). This
suggests that subjects are more likely to select into the variable pay schemes the more
productive they believe they are relative to other participants. Note, however, that
raw correlations might predominantly reﬂect productivity sorting given that self-assessed
ranks and true ranks are highly correlated: The correlation between a subject’s self-
assessed rank and his or her true rank based on Productivity Indicator 3 is 0.695 (see
Table 1). Controlling for productivity, it turns out that the impact of self-assessment
on the sorting decision is signiﬁcant in the tournament schemes (p-value < 0.076), but
is insigniﬁcant in the piece-rate treatment (p-value < 0.835) and the revenue-sharing
treatment (p-value < 0.162), as shown in Table 2. The marginal eﬀect estimates for
the tournament scheme implies that a subject with a more positive self-assessment of
one rank is about 3 percent more likely to enter the tournament than a less optimistic
but equally productive subject (Column (2)). In other words subjects are more likely to
select into tournaments the better they think their relative performance is, for a given
true rank. If a subject can be classiﬁed as overconﬁdent if he or she overestimates his or
her true rank these results also suggest that overconﬁdent (underconﬁdent) subjects are
ated with variable pay when output depends upon factors beyond their control, which triggers a trade-oﬀ
of risk and incentives (see Prendergast, 1999 and references therein).
18We prefer this risk measure over the lottery measure elicited in step 11 since several subjects did not
have a unique switching point and it is not clear how these observations should be treated. Moreover, like
Dohmen et al. (2009), who have shown that answers to this question reliably predicted lottery choices in
a paid ﬁeld experiment, we also ﬁnd a strong correlation between subjects’ answers to the risk question
and the lottery choices in our experiment.
19An interesting ﬁnding is, however, that among those who opt for the ﬁxed payment in the revenue-
sharing treatment, the group of subjects with above median productivity is on average 1.45 points less
willing to take risks than the subjects with below median productivity. This diﬀerences is statistically
signiﬁcant (t-test, p-value < 0.025).
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more (less) likely to select into tournaments.
Another potential driver of self-selection are social preferences. Traditional contract
theory is based on the assumption that principals and agents are solely interested in their
own material payoﬀs. In contrast, there is by now considerable evidence indicating that
a substantial fraction of people also care about reciprocal fairness (see the overviews by
Colin Camerer, 2003; Fehr and Ga¨chter, 2006; and Fehr and Klaus M. Schmidt, 2000).
The co-existence of selﬁsh and reciprocally motivated agents changes the optimality con-
ditions of diﬀerent types of contracts. For example, Fehr, Alexander Klein and Schmidt
(2007) ﬁnd in their experiment that contracts, which are optimal when all actors are
selﬁsh, may be less eﬃcient when there is a minority of people who care about fairness.
Furthermore, contracts that are ineﬃcient if all actors are selﬁsh may achieve surprisingly
high levels of eﬃciency when there are some fair-minded people. Theoretical implications
of social preferences for optimal contracting are derived in Christian Grund and Dirk Sli-
wka (2005), Florian Englmaier and Achim Wambach (2008), and Kosfeld and von Siemens
(2007). Given the relevance of social preferences for optimal contracting it is important
to understand whether they also aﬀect the sorting of agents.
Remember from Section B that all subjects participated in a trust game in both roles
as ﬁrst and second mover, which allows us to assess willingness to trust and reciprocal
inclination for each subject. As an indicator for trust we use the amount sent to the second
mover. To classify agents with respect to their reciprocal inclination, we determined
for each subject the relation between transfer and back transfer running simple OLS
regressions of the back transfers on received transfers, forcing the slope to go through the
origin. Results in Table 2 show that neither trust nor reciprocity signiﬁcantly determine
the sorting decision. This holds for all treatments with the exception of a very small
eﬀect for trust in the piece-rate treatment.
Finally we study whether gender aﬀects the sorting decision into variable pay. In a re-
cent paper Niederle and Vesterlund (2007) show that women shy away from competition.
This ﬁnding is particularly interesting since it oﬀers a potential explanation for the gender
wage gap. If women are more likely than men to prefer non-competitive and non-variable
pay, this would, according to our ﬁndings in Section A, translate directly into lower av-
erage wages for women than for men. Results in Table 2 suggest that gender does not
signiﬁcantly aﬀect the choice between the ﬁxed payment and the variable pay alternative
in any treatment, conditional on productivity, risk attitudes, relative self-assessment and
social preferences.20
Before jumping to the conclusion that there are no gender diﬀerences in the sorting deci-
sion, one might raise the question whether the conditional probability is a useful measure
for answering the question of whether women tend to avoid competitive environments. In
fact, if there are important gender diﬀerences in attributes that we condition on and that
aﬀect the sorting decision, then gender diﬀerences in sorting choices need not be unveiled
by a signiﬁcant coeﬃcient for the gender dummy, but might be reﬂected in signiﬁcant
estimates of gender speciﬁc attributes. Risk attitudes might be such an important factor
through which gender diﬀerences manifest: for one thing, our ﬁndings show that risk at-
titudes aﬀect the sorting decision. At the same time, accumulating evidence reveals that
women tend on average to be more risk averse than men (for an overview of studies see
Rachel Croson and Gneezy, 2009). This result is conﬁrmed by the signiﬁcantly negative
correlation between being female and risk attitude reported in Table 1.21
20The coeﬃcient on the gender dummy becomes statistically signiﬁcant at the 10-percent level only in
the tournament treatment once we control for personality diﬀerences. Here, the marginal eﬀect implies
that women are 22 percent less likely to enter a tournament.
21In fact, both behavior in the lottery experiment as well as responses to the risk question, reveal that
women are more risk averse than men. Average responses to the general risk question are 4.84 for women
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In order to check whether there is reason to believe that gender diﬀerences in sorting
behavior is camouﬂaged by attributes, in which men and women diﬀer and that aﬀect the
sorting decision, we revert to the raw data. We show in Table 4 that women seem indeed
to prefer ﬁxed wages to a higher extent than men in our experiment. The table reveals
that only 46.4 percent of all women prefer the variable pay alternative compared to 69.8
percent of all men. This gender diﬀerence is very strong in the piece-rate treatment and
in the tournament treatment, and somewhat smaller in the revenue-sharing treatment
(albeit a 20 percentage point diﬀerence between men and women). The raw gender
diﬀerence is highly statistically signiﬁcant. In unreported regressions we investigated
how the size and signiﬁcance of the gender diﬀerence in sorting behavior change when we
step-wise add controls for productivity and various preferences and attitudes. It turns
out that the gender diﬀerence remains signiﬁcant if we only condition on productivity.
Figure 5 illustrates this result by comparing the sorting decisions of men and women with
similar productivity levels. The ﬁgure shows for each treatment separately as well as for
all treatments pooled the fraction of males and females in a given productivity cluster who
sort into variable pay. We use the following clusters according to Productivity Indicator
3: less than 15, 15 to 19, 20 to 25, and above 25 problems solved. For example, in the
piece-rate treatment, displayed in the upper left panel, about 60 percent of the male
participants who solved 15 to 19 correct answers in the 5 minute work period choose
the variable pay, while only about 40 percent of the female participants with the same
productivity level do. If we pool all treatments, shown in the lower right panel of Figure
5, we ﬁnd that men are more likely to choose variable pay than women in each of the
four productivity brackets.
In a next step, we added risk preferences. The coeﬃcient on the gender dummy becomes
insigniﬁcant and also considerably smaller in size once we control for productivity and risk
preferences. Similar to Nabanita Datta Gupta, Anders Poulsen and Villeval (2005), but
contrary to the ﬁndings by Niederle and Vesterlund (2007), part of the gender diﬀerences
can thus be attributed to diﬀerences in productivity and risk preferences in our set-up.
Note, however, that in their set-up the decision is between piece rates and tournaments
and not between ﬁxed wages and variable pay as in our study. Since both options in their
study are variable pay schemes, they are both associated with some risk and uncertainty.
Therefore risk preferences may be less important to motivate the sorting decision than in
our set-up. Regardless of why we observe the gender diﬀerences, however, both studies
show an important interaction between gender and contractual choice.
Concluding our discussion of Table 2, note that our results are robust to controlling
for personality traits using a variant of the so-called Big-5 inventory.22 This is important
since personality itself could be an important driver of self-selection but also since it could
be correlated with our other characteristics, e.g., risk attitudes (Angela Lee Duckworth
et al., 2008).
In our analysis so far we have assumed that attitudes and preferences aﬀect the sorting
decisions of all subjects in the same way, i.e., regardless of how productive they are.
An interesting possibility is that the extent to which particular personal characteristics
aﬀect the sorting decision depends on the location in the productivity distribution. In
other words, personal characteristics are likely to matter diﬀerently for “marginal types”,
i.e., for subjects whose selection decision is on the fence than for subjects whose decision
is basically determined by their productivity (or other characteristics). To illustrate
consider the role of risk attitudes in the piece-rate treatment. One would expect risk
attitudes to matter most for workers who are close to the productivity threshold for a
and 5.80 for men (medians are 5 and 6, respectively). This is in line with the ﬁndings of Dohmen et al.
(2009).
22See footnote 7.
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risk neutral agent: After all, very productive subjects who are far above the productivity
threshold should always prefer the piece rate regardless of their risk attitudes. Likewise,
very unproductive subjects should always prefer the ﬁxed payment, again regardless of
their risk attitudes. In order to test for multi-dimensional sorting among marginal and
among non-marginal types we ran the same regressions as in Table 2 on particular sub-
populations in Table 3. Determining marginal types is relatively straightforward in the
piece-rate treatment. In Column (1) of Table 3, we estimated the model from Table
2 on the sample of 76 subjects who solved between 10 and 30 problems in step 3 of
the experiment. We chose these numbers because 20 problems would be a risk-neutral
subject’s productivity threshold in the piece-rate treatment if disutility that results when
eﬀort is raised from minimum eﬀort level in the ﬁxed payment to optimal eﬀort in the
piece treatment is negligibly small, and if subjects expect to produce twice as much when
working time is twice as long. The results reported in the ﬁrst column of Table 3 conﬁrm
that estimated marginal eﬀect of our risk measure is in fact larger in this sub-sample
(7.3 percent) compared to the whole sample in Column (1) of Table 2 (5.3 percent).
Thus the role of risk attitudes in the piece-rate treatment depends on the location in the
productivity distribution.
Determining marginal types for the tournament and the revenue-sharing treatment
based only on productivity is not feasible, since decisions are based on beliefs about other
participants’ productivity and potentially other factors as well. We therefore propose a
diﬀerent approach to deﬁne marginal and non-marginal types based on response times.
The idea is that marginal types need more time to determine their decision than non-
marginal types. In the piece-rate treatment, e.g., it is an easy and quick decision to select
the variable pay mode if one is either very productive or very unproductive. Subjects
with intermediate productivity supposedly need more time and deliberation to decide.
Participants’ response times are automatically recorded in each step of the experiment.
For each subject we know how much time has elapsed between the presentation of the
sorting decision screen and their actual decision. In Columns (2) to (7) of Table 3 we
classify subjects according to median response times. A subject who needed more time
to decide than the median subject is considered a marginal type; those who needed
less time are classiﬁed as non-marginal types. For each treatment we ran two separate
regressions one for marginal, one for non-marginal types. Columns (2) and (3) show
the results for the piece-rate treatment. In support of our response time based notion
of marginal types, it turns out that marginal types deﬁned by response times show an
extremely similar pattern to marginal types classiﬁed according to threshold productivity
(compare Columns (1) and (2)). In particular, the coeﬃcient for risk attitudes is quite
large (marginal eﬀect is 7.6 percent) and highly signiﬁcant. This is in sharp contrast to
non-marginal types, where risk attitudes play no role at all.23 Turning to the tournament
treatment we again ﬁnd a diﬀerential pattern. Non-marginal types, i.e., those who decide
relatively quickly base their decision on productivity and relative self-assessment. In
both cases marginal eﬀects are larger than for the whole sample (2.3 vs. 1.8 percent for
productivity and 4.6 vs. 2.7 percent for relative self-assessment). The coeﬃcient on risk
attitudes is not signiﬁcant. Risk attitudes matter strongly, however, for marginal types.
For marginal types the marginal eﬀect is 12.3 percent and considerably larger than for
the whole sample (8.7 percent). In the revenue-sharing treatment marginal types are
more likely to enter this pay scheme the more productive they are.24 Taken together
23Note that response times per se are not signiﬁcantly related to gender, preferences and attitudes
(risk attitudes, relative self-assessment, trust, reciprocity) as linear regression analysis shows; and none of
these characteristics signiﬁcantly predicts the type classiﬁcation (marginal vs. non-marginal) as a probit
analysis reveals.
24Non-marginal types are more likely to opt for revenue-sharing the more trusting they are, while
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the results in Table 3 show that the role of personal characteristics for subjects’ sorting
decision depends on whether they are close to the fence, as proxied by how long they
need to take a decision.
C. Eﬀort Provision and Output Changes
Although the main focus of this paper is on sorting, it is interesting to know whether
participants’ performance is aﬀected by diﬀerent incentives. In this section we therefore
discuss how output and eﬀort provision vary across diﬀerent incentive schemes. Intu-
itively, subjects in the variable pay schemes should provide at least as much eﬀort as
subjects who are paid according to a ﬁxed-payment contract, simply because all variable
payment schemes add an explicit reward for providing eﬀort. Consequently, we also ex-
pect that subjects in variable pay schemes feel more stressed and get more exhausted
than subjects who work for the ﬁxed payment.
These expectations are all borne out by the data. Table 5 compares average self-
reported eﬀort levels, stress and exhaustion for two subgroups: subjects who sorted into
the variable compensation scheme and subjects who opted for the ﬁxed compensation
scheme. Panel (a) shows the results for the piece-rate treatment, while Panels (b) and
(c) show the outcomes for the tournament and revenue-sharing treatments, respectively.
Columns (1) to (3) of the table refer to the 5-minute work period (step 3), in which all
subjects worked under the exact same incentives. For example, mean eﬀort in the piece
rate treatment is 5.60 for those who later selected into the piece rate while it is 5.49
for those who later prefer the ﬁxed pay. This diﬀerence is not statistically signiﬁcant as
the corresponding p-value in Column (3) reveals. In fact, for all treatments there are
no statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerences in eﬀort, stress, and exhaustion between the two
subgroups.
Things change completely, however, when subjects work in their preferred incentive
scheme during the 10-minute work task (see Columns (4) to (6)). In the piece-rate treat-
ment, for example, mean eﬀort is now 6.03 for workers receiving a piece rate, while it is
only 4.26 for the ﬁxed wage group. This diﬀerence is highly statistically signiﬁcant as the
p-value in Column (6) shows. Results in Table 5 reveal that in all treatments, subjects
with a variable compensation contract provide signiﬁcantly more eﬀort and feel signiﬁ-
cantly more stressed than subjects in the ﬁxed payment scheme. Regression estimates
from an Ordered Probit model with eﬀort measured on the 7-point scale as dependent
variable reinforces the result that subjects working for variable pay provide more eﬀort,
also when controlling for individual productivity.25 A comparison of eﬀorts in Columns
(2) and (5) further shows that subjects who select into the ﬁxed-payment contract put
forth less eﬀort than they previously did when they were working in the piece rate condi-
tion. Sign-rank tests, which are not reported in the table, conﬁrm that this slacking oﬀ is
statistically signiﬁcant.26 A comparison of Columns (1) and (4) reveals that self-reported
eﬀort for the 10-minute work task is higher in all treatments. This increase is highest for
non-marginal types are less likely to enter the revenue-sharing scheme the more trusting they are. One
potential explanation is that more trusting marginal subjects have less optimistic beliefs about the
teammate’s productivity (from the 5-minute condition) rendering it more attractive to select the revenue-
sharing treatment ceteris paribus.
25The results are available upon request.
26In this respect it is interesting to compare eﬀort diﬀerences within the sample of subjects who
selected into the ﬁxed payment. In a regression in which the dependent variable takes the value one if
subjects in the ﬁxed payment scheme provide low output (output between 0 and 10, 8 percent of subjects
in the ﬁxed payment) on the same set of control variables as in Table 2, we do not ﬁnd any statistically
signiﬁcant eﬀects (at the 5-percent level), with the exception of productivity (i.e., indicating that more
productive workers are less likely to produce low output).
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tournament participants and lowest for participants in the revenue-sharing scheme. Table
5 also indicates that subjects who work for variable pay tend to get more exhausted, but
diﬀerences in exhaustion levels are never signiﬁcant.
Our data also permit us to shed some light on the eﬀort response to variable pay (i.e.,
the incentive eﬀect) by comparing within-subject output diﬀerences between the 5-minute
work task and the selected variable payment conditions for participants who sorted into
the variable pay schemes. To test, for example, whether tournament incentives trigger
larger changes in output than piece-rate or revenue-sharing incentives – as suggested
by the self-reported measures – we compare output in the 5-minute work period with
output in the ﬁrst 5 minutes of the 10-minute work period for participants in these three
diﬀerent variable incentive schemes. We use output diﬀerences within subjects to control
for ability diﬀerences and consider only output of the ﬁrst 5 minutes of the 10-minute
task because of potential fatigue eﬀects. Output is statistically signiﬁcantly higher in
the ﬁrst ﬁve minutes of the 10-minute work task than in the 5-minute work task in all
treatments as Wilcoxon tests reveal (piece-rate treatment: p-values < 0.0051; tournament
treatment: p-value < 0.0003; revenue-sharing treatment: p-value < 0.031). The average
increase in output is highest in the tournament treatment (3.4 more answers, t-test, p-
value < 0.002) followed by the piece-rate (1.8, p-value < 0.007) and revenue-sharing
treatment (1.5, p-value < 0.035).
III. Discussion
In this paper we have provided controlled laboratory evidence on the importance of
multi-dimensional sorting. Productive workers are more likely to self-select into variable
payment schemes when oﬀered a ﬁxed payment scheme as an alternative. This holds for
piece-rate, tournament as well as revenue-sharing schemes. Incentives also aﬀect eﬀort
provision. In our study workers report higher eﬀort levels in pay for performance schemes
than in ﬁxed payment schemes. Moreover, they report higher levels of stress and exhaus-
tion. Yet, productivity sorting explains a substantial part of output diﬀerences observed
in variable versus ﬁxed payment schemes. Controlling for productivity, workers are more
likely to prefer a ﬁxed payment scheme the more risk averse they are, especially when
the choice is between piece-rate or tournaments and ﬁxed wages. Risk attitudes do not
seem to matter at all for the decision to select into team incentive schemes. Tournaments
attract workers who believe their performance is high, relative to other workers. This
eﬀect plays no role in piece-rates, which makes sense because in this treatment payoﬀs
are independent of the output of others. Variable payment schemes generally attract
fewer women, an eﬀect that is partly driven by an underlying gender diﬀerence in risk
attitudes and productivity. The eﬀect is strongest in the most competitive scheme, the
tournament. Additional results show that the impact of personal characteristics on the
sorting decision is heterogenous, and that social preferences seem to play only a marginal
role. Sorting generally depends on a subject’s location in the productivity distribution
or on whether a subject’s decision is on the fence.
While productivity is a strong and signiﬁcant determinant of sorting into all variable
pay schemes, the importance of preferences and attitudes on the sorting decision depends
on the type of variable incentives. On the whole, we ﬁnd less robust eﬀects of preferences
and attitudes on sorting into our revenue-sharing scheme compared to sorting into the
piece-rate or tournament scheme. We interpret this ﬁnding to reﬂect that the decision
between revenue-sharing and ﬁxed wages is quite complex and deﬁnitely more diﬃcult
than, for example, between a ﬁxed payment and a piece rate. Support for this interpreta-
tion comes from the fact that subjects need signiﬁcantly longer to decide than in the piece
rate treatment. Respective median response times for the piece-rate, tournament, and
revenue-sharing treatment are 34.5 seconds, 72 seconds, and 116 seconds, respectively. In
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addition variance in output is signiﬁcantly higher in the revenue-sharing treatment sug-
gesting that not only the decision to enter is complex but also that conditional on having
selected into the revenue-sharing treatment the incentive structure is more complex than
in the other two treatments.
It is interesting to know whether the observed sorting has lead to an eﬃcient outcome.
In other words one could ask whether subjects made the “right” sorting decision and
how this depends on the incentive scheme. Deriving individual optimality conditions is
not straightforward, however, given that we use a real eﬀort task and therefore do not
know individual eﬀort costs, and given that preferences and attitudes are relevant for
the evaluation of particular sorting outcomes. What can be done, however, is to check
whether subjects behave in a revenue maximizing way. This is relatively straightforward
for subjects who opt for the variable pay as their counterfactual earnings (400 points)
are known. However, for subjects who opt for the ﬁxed payment, it is diﬃcult to assess
whether their choice was revenue maximizing as the counterfactual earnings in the vari-
able pay scheme are not observed. We therefore concentrate on analyzing whether the
sorting decisions of those who opted for the variable pay are revenue maximizing.
In the piece rate treatment, 64 of the 73 individuals (87.7 percent) who opted for the
piece rate earned more than 400 points, and 9 individuals earned less. For all but one
of the nine individuals who earned less than 400 points in the piece rate, the sorting
decision was also not optimal ex ante if these subjects expected to solve twice as many
problems in 10 minutes than they solved in 5 minutes. In the tournament treatment, we
can ex post assess whether choices of tournament participants were revenue-maximizing
in the following way: Given the output of a subject who chose the tournament we can
check how many other subjects who have opted for the tournament had a higher or a
lower output. This determines the expected probability of winning given the realized
sorting pattern. Multiplying this probability with the winner prize in the tournament
(1300) yields an expected payoﬀ. If this expected payoﬀ exceeds the ﬁxed payment
(400) the sorting decision was revenue maximizing. This holds for 42 of the 60 (i.e.,
70 percent) tournament participants. In the revenue-sharing treatment, 60 of the 76
subjects (78.9 percent) who opted for the revenue-sharing contract end up with a payoﬀ
of more than 400 points. This does not necessarily imply, however, that subjects who
ended up with less than 400 points did not make a sorting decision that was revenue-
maximizing in expectations because their decision had to be based on expected output of
all participants who opted for revenue-sharing. To address this issue, we take a subject’s
output in revenue-sharing teams and add it to the average output of all other subjects
who worked under the revenue-sharing scheme in order to calculate expected output in
revenue-sharing teams, given the observed sorting and output patterns. It turns out that
this expected output is smaller than 80 (i.e., expected revenue is smaller than 400) for
only 7 subjects.
Even though we have already highlighted multiple dimensions of sorting, the sorting
process is in general much more complex. For example, self-selection into jobs will in
general not only depend on personal characteristics but also on the nature of the job and
task. In this paper we have studied one particular type of task while varying incentives;
it would also be important to study sorting dependent on the nature of the task for a
given incentive, for example tasks that diﬀer with respect to self determination, intrinsic
interest, how challenging it is, etc.
An interesting question is whether the sorting patterns that we observe in the lab
generalize qualitatively to labor markets outside the lab. Are individual characteristics
such as productivity or risk attitudes systematically correlated with modes of payment?
We can investigate this issue for the German labor market by analyzing data from the
German Socio-Economic Panel Study (SOEP). The SOEP is a representative panel survey
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of the adult population living in Germany. All members over the age of 17 of a household
in the sample are asked for a wide range of personal and household information, and for
their attitudes on assorted topics.27 Each wave records information on the respondents
current labor market status. The 2004 wave of the SOEP included an additional question
on whether the performance of a respondent is regularly evaluated in a formal procedure, a
requisite element of performance contingent remuneration schemes (see Grund and Sliwka,
2009). As a proxy for productivity we use years of education, experience in full-time and
part-time employment, and tenure. Respondents in the 2004 wave also answered a survey
question on their willingness to take risks that subjects in the experiment answered and
that has been experimentally validated in Dohmen et al. (2009) (See section B). In
addition, we have survey measures on individuals’ trust attitudes from the 2003 wave
and measures of reciprocity from the 2005 wave.28 We also control for age.
We estimate Probit models in order to assess how the probability of working under
a variable payment scheme is related to productivity, risk attitudes, social preferences
and gender. Table 6 reports marginal eﬀect estimates. The dependent variable in both
speciﬁcations takes the value 1 if the respondent’s performance is regularly assessed in a
formal evaluation procedure. This measure is a rough indicator of variable pay; and in
a sense corresponds to our pooled regression, shown in Column (4) of Table 2 where we
combine information from diﬀerent variable incentive schemes.
Column (1) reveals that the probability to work under some variable pay scheme in-
creases in productivity, measured in terms of years of schooling, experience and tenure.
For example, one year of schooling increases the probability by 2.2 percentage points.
Consistent with the sorting decisions in the experiment we ﬁnd that more risk tolerant
workers are more likely to work in jobs with performance evaluation. The eﬀect is sig-
niﬁcant both statistically as well as economically. The marginal eﬀect of 0.010 implies
that a worker who is completely willing to take risks on the 11-point scale has an about
10 percent higher likelihood to work under variable pay than a worker who is completely
unwilling to take risks, assuming that the marginal eﬀect at the mean applies to the en-
tire range of admissible answers. This corresponds to about 4.5 years of schooling. The
estimates also suggest that individuals who are less reciprocal are more likely to work for
variable pay; the impact of trust is not signiﬁcant. Women are on average 6 percent less
likely to work for variable pay than men, a result that is similar to our experimental re-
sults. As in the experiment, this eﬀect is considerably higher if we do not include controls
for risk attitudes and productivity. The coeﬃcient estimates in Column (2) show that
these ﬁndings are largely robust to controlling for ﬁrm size, industry sector, and broad in-
dicators for occupational categories. The latter capture the job type (e.g., white-collar vs.
blue-collar) and level, ranging from untrained worker to master craftsmen for blue-collar
workers and from employee with simple duties without training/education certiﬁcate to
employee with extensive managerial duties (e.g., managing director, manager, head of a
large ﬁrm or concern) for white-collar workers. Not surprisingly, the coeﬃcients on pro-
ductivity measures become smaller in size since the controls for occupational categories
essentially capture heterogeneity in productivity. The impact of risk attitudes and gender
also remains strong.29
Additional complementary evidence is provided by Holger Bonin et al. (2007), who use
data from the SOEP and ﬁnd that individuals who are more willing to take risks are
more likely to work in occupations with higher earnings variability, and Dohmen et al.
(2005), who observe that risk averse workers are more likely to be employed in the public
27For more details on the SOEP, see www.diw.de/gsoep/.
28For further details, see Dohmen et al. (2008).
29The results also hold when we restrict our sample to the private sector only. In fact, the impact of
productivity and gender even becomes somewhat stronger.
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sector, where – according to the ﬁndings in Column 2 of Table 6 – performance pay is
less prevalent. The public sector is characterized by ﬁxed wages and low risks concerning
income variability and unemployment, but also by relatively low wages compared to the
private sector. An inspection of the SOEP data shows that women in Germany are more
likely to work in the public sector than men. Among full-time employees, 32.96 percent
of all women work in the public sector and 67.04 percent in the private sector. The
respective numbers for men are 21.25 percent and 78.75 percent.
In sum these results are quite similar to our ﬁndings from the lab. Of course one
should interpret the results from the ﬁeld with care: unlike with the experimental data
we cannot, e.g., exclude the possibility of reversed causality. Nevertheless we think that
exploiting complementarities between controlled lab and large-scale ﬁeld data is useful
and that ﬁnding similar sorting patterns with these complementary data sets is suggestive
for the importance and systematics of multi-dimensional sorting.
Multi-dimensional sorting has several important implications. When designing incen-
tives, organizations should not only focus on eﬀort eﬀects but also consider the self-
selection of diﬀerent types of workers. Given that many of the discussed personal at-
tributes, such as risk aversion or overconﬁdence are diﬃcult to observe in the process of
recruitment, an incentive scheme may also serve the purpose of a screening device. Of
course, sorting is not only relevant between but also within ﬁrms. Firms can oﬀer diﬀer-
ent career paths to get the right people on the right job. For example, there might be jobs
within the ﬁrm where it is important to prevent workers from excessive risk taking (e.g.,
safety oﬃcers), i.e., where it is important to employ risk averse workers (high downside
risk for the ﬁrm). This may render variable pay suboptimal for this job. In other jobs
of the same ﬁrm risk tolerance may be advantageous, rendering variable pay optimal.
As a consequence the ﬁrm oﬀers diﬀerent contracts for diﬀerent jobs in order to induce
workers to self-select optimally. Note that in our experiment we study an extreme case:
either no variable pay (ﬁxed wages) or only variable pay (zero ﬁxed wage component).
Contracts in ﬁrms typically combine both elements. By adjusting the relative weight of
variable pay, the ﬁrm can inﬂuence the allocation of workers into diﬀerent jobs.
Our results also shed light on the question why ﬁrms use diﬀerent incentive schemes
even when operating in similar environments. A possible explanation is that they have
diﬀerent requirements regarding the composition of their workforce, which they manage
to attract with diﬀerent organizational features. Our ﬁndings on gender and risk attitudes
point to a potential channel for gender diﬀerences in occupational choice, career choice,
and ultimately for the existence of the gender wage gap.
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Table 2—Determinants of Sorting
Dependent variable 1 if piece rate 1 if tournament 1 if revenue sharing 1 if variable pay
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Productivity indicator 3 0.044*** 0.018*** 0.016*** 0.023***
[0.009] [0.007] [0.003] [0.004]
Risk attitude 0.053*** 0.087*** 0.008 0.054***
[0.015] [0.032] [0.013] [0.014]
Relative self-assessment 0.003 -0.027* -0.020 -0.015*
[0.015] [0.015] [0.014] [0.009]
Trust (amount sent) 0.002* 0.002 -0.001 0.001
[0.001] [0.002] [0.002] [0.001]
Reciprocity 0.006 0.012 0.063 0.012
[0.041] [0.098] [0.046] [0.034]
1 if female 0.029 -0.157 -0.097 -0.068
[0.121] [0.137] [0.075] [0.059]
Pseudo R2 0.410 0.307 0.204 0.268
Observations 120 120 120 360
Notes: Probit estimates. Marginal eﬀects (evaluated at the mean of independent variables) reported; * signiﬁcant
at 10%; ** signiﬁcant at 5%; *** signiﬁcant at 1%. Robust standard errors clustered for sessions are reported in
brackets below the marginal eﬀects estimates. The smaller the value of the self-assessment variable is, the more
productive a subject thinks he is relative to others.
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Table 4—Proportions of Men and Women Sorting Into Variable Pay Schemes
Piece rate Tournament Revenue sharing All variable
Women 47.5 37.3 54.0 46.4
Men 73.8 62.3 73.7 69.8
Notes: The table shows the percentages of men and women
who select into the variable pay schemes.
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Table 5—Effort, Stress, and Exhaustion
(a) Eﬀort, Stress and Exhaustion in Piece-Rate Treatment
Before sorting decision After sorting decision
Piece rate Fixed M-W test Piece rate Fixed M-W test
(Mean) (Mean) (p-value) (Mean) (Mean) (p-value)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Eﬀort 5.60 5.49 0.596 6.03 4.26 < 0.001
Stress 5.48 5.62 0.502 5.71 3.51 < 0.001
Exhaustion 3.05 2.74 0.317 4.07 2.68 < 0.001
Number of observations 73 47 73 47
(b) Eﬀort, Stress and Exhaustion in Tournament Treatment
Before sorting decision After sorting decision
Tournament Fixed M-W test Tournament Fixed M-W test
(Mean) (Mean) (p-value) (Mean) (Mean) (p-value)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Eﬀort 5.57 5.37 0.264 6.23 4.70 < 0.001
Stress 5.43 5.48 0.524 5.80 3.95 < 0.001
Exhaustion 2.93 2.93 0.698 3.67 3.30 < 0.268
Number of observations 60 60 60 60
(c) Eﬀort, Stress and Exhaustion in Revenue-Sharing Treatment
Before sorting decision After sorting decision
Revenue sharing Fixed M-W test Revenue sharing Fixed M-W test
(Mean) (Mean) (p-value) (Mean) (Mean) (p-value)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Eﬀort 5.54 5.39 0.536 5.66 4.48 < 0.001
Stress 5.41 5.61 0.241 5.37 3.91 < 0.001
Exhaustion 2.57 2.50 0.806 3.63 2.84 < 0.020
Number of observations 76 44 76 44
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Table 6—Survey Evidence on Sorting into Performance Pay
Dependent variable: 1 if performance evaluation
(1) (2)
Years of schooling 0.022*** -0.001
[0.002] [0.003]
Experience full-time (in years) 0.011*** 0.006***
[0.002] [0.002]
Experience full-time2/100 -0.021*** -0.011**
[0.004] [0.005]
Experience part-time (in years) -0.002 0.000
[0.003] [0.004]
Experience part-time2/100 0.008 0.003
[0.013] [0.014]
Tenure (in years) 0.004*** -0.002**
[0.001] [0.001]
Age (in years) -0.006*** -0.003**
[0.001] [0.001]
Risk attitude 0.010*** 0.008***
[0.002] [0.003]
Trust in strangers -0.001 0.004
[0.008] [0.008]
Reciprocity -0.014** -0.008
[0.006] [0.006]
1 if female -0.057*** -0.041***
[0.012] [0.014]
i if in public sector -0.050***
[0.016]
1 if living in East Germany 0.020
[0.014]
Firm size dummies no yes
Industry dummies no yes
Occupation dummies no yes
Pseudo R2 0.0340 0.140
Observations 8159 8110
Notes: Probit estimates. Marginal eﬀects (evaluated at the mean of
independent variables) are reported. Robust standard errors are re-
ported in brackets; ** signiﬁcant at 5%, *** signiﬁcant at 1%. The
data are from the 2004 wave of the German Socio-Economic Panel
Study (SOEP), except for the survey measures of trust and reci-
procity which are taken from the 2003 and 2005 wave respectively.
The dependent variable is a binary variable that takes the value 1
if the respondent’s performance is regularly evaluated by a super-
visor according to a formal procedure. The sample is restricted to
respondents aged 65 and younger. We exclude respondents who are
either self-employed, not in regular employment, enrolled in school
or in apprenticeship.
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Figure 1. Output of Self-Selected Subjects in Different Compensation Schemes
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(a) Piece-rate treatment
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Notes: Each panel of the ﬁgure plots, for a particular treatment, the cumulative distributions of
individual output (measured as the number of correct answers during the total working time of ten
minutes). Panel (a) shows the cumulative output distribution in the piece-rate treatment, Panel
(b)shows the cumulative output distribution in the tournament treatment, and Panel (c) shows the
cumulative output distribution in the revenue-sharing treatment.
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Figure 2. Performance and Task Difficulty
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Notes: The ﬁgure shows, for each treatment, how much time (in seconds) subjects working
in a particular self-selected regime need on average to solve a question of a given degree of
diﬃculty.
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Figure 3. Productivity of Subjects before Self-Selection Into Incentive Contract
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Notes: Each panel of the ﬁgure plots cumulative distributions of Productivity Indica-
tor 3, which measures the number of correct answers during a 5-minute work period,
separately for subjects who subsequently chose the ﬁxed payment alternative and
those who subsequently prefer the variable payment alternative. Panel (a) refers to
the piece-rate treatment, and Panel (b) and Panel (c) to the tournament treatment
and revenue-sharing treatment respectively.
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Figure 4. Fraction of Subjects Opting for Variable Pay and Average Productivity of Sorted
Subjects
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(c) Revenue-sharing treatment
Notes: The upper graph of each panel shows average productivity, measure by Pro-
ductivity Indicator 3, among subjects who would sort into the respective variable
payment scheme at a particular ﬁxed payment alternative. The lower graph of each
panel displays the number of subjects who would opt for variable compensation at
a given oﬀered ﬁxed payment alternative. Panel (a) refers to the piece-rate treat-
ment, Panel (b) to the tournament treatment and Panel (c) to the revenue-sharing
treatment.
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Figure 5. Gender and Sorting
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Notes: The ﬁgure shows what fraction of men and women with a particular productivity
level selects into the variable payment scheme.
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